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PROPERTY LAW
GET IN LINE, THE LINE FORMS AT THE DOOR: A
LANDLORD'S LIEN FOR DISTRAINT ENJOYS
SENIORITY OVER PRIOR PERFECTED SECURITY
INTERESTS IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I. INTRODUCTION
In Greenwood Petroleum Co. v. Wingard (Exparte Smith)' the South
Carolina Court of Appeals held that a landlord's lien for unpaid rent takes
priority over a creditor's security interest in the tenant's property even though
the creditor's interest arose first in time.2 The issue of priority between these
competing liens is not unique to South Carolina; a survey of state law indicates
that at least ten state courts have ruled on this exact issue.3 Although at first
glance the problem appears to be simple, the issue is far more complicated than
it seems. The problem arises because Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) excludes landlords' liens from its coverage.4 Without Article 9
authority, courts are forced to grapple with this issue under non-Code law.
Hence, non-UCC landlords' liens compete with UCC-created security interests
for priority, and courts have had to untangle pre-UCC schemes to determine
priorities among the competing parties with varying results from one
jurisdiction to the next.'
Part II of this Note discusses cases from various jurisdictions to
introduce this problem in sundry factual circumstances and to illustrate
different solutions reached by courts across the country. Part III focuses on
South Carolina's non-UCC law on this issue and reviews the South Carolina
General Assembly's recent repeal of section 27-39-260, which once provided
a method for untangling this priority problem. Part IV examines Wingard and
discusses the South Carolina Court of Appeals's analysis of this priority issue
in light of two other South Carolina decisions in this area. Finally, this Note
concludes with a suggestion for resolving this case on appeal in a manner that
1. 300 S.C. 479,498 S.E.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1998).
2. Id. at 482, 498 S.E.2d at 910.
3. See generally Annotation, Secured Transactions: Priority as Between Statutory
Landlord's Lien and Security Interest Perfected in Accordance with the Uniform Commercial
Code, 99 A.L.R.3d 1006 (1980) (surveying by jurisdiction various approaches to the priority
issue) [hereinafter Annotation].
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-104(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976). Title 36 is South Carolina's
enacted version of the Uniform Commercial Code.
5. See Annotation, supra note 3, § 2, at 1008.
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comports with the legislature's intent as evidenced by the legislative history
from the repeal of section 27-39-260.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM
Article 9 specifically excludes landlords' liens from coverage." Thus,
courts faced with a priority dispute between a landlord's lien and a perfected
security interest are forced to resolve the issue in various ways. A majority of
courts confronted with the issue have looked to pre-UCC or non-UCC law to
determine priority between a landlord's lien and a security interest
A. Pre-UCC or Non-UCC Law
1. Absolute Rule of Preference
In jurisdictions with a rule of absolute preference, courts faced with
this priority problem would apply the rule of preference and give priority to
either the landlord or the creditor according to the pre-UCC rule in effect.' In
Hartwell v. Hartwell Co.' a New Jersey court determined it would resolve
priority disputes between a landlord and a secured creditor according to pre-
UCC New Jersey law because Article 9 did not cover landlords' liens."0 The
Hartwell Company leased premises belonging to lantha for a term of ten
years." Subsequently, a husband and wife purchased all of Hartwell's stock."2
The purchase agreement allowed the sellers, Jack and Jennifer Hartwell, to
exercise their rights pursuant to a security agreement if the purchasers failed to
meet weekly payments. 3 This security agreement gave the Hartwells an
interest in all of the company's collateral assets. 4
The purchasers defaulted on the weekly payments, and the Hartwells
moved forward to collect the company's assets pursuant to the purchase
agreement.' s Meanwhile, Iantha (the landlord) intervened in the suit to enforce
its statutorily defined landlord's lien.'6 When asked by the parties to determine
the priority of the competing interests, the court found that New Jersey
common law had a rule of preference for the secured creditor.' Therefore, the
6. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-104(b).
7. Annotation, supra note 3, § 2, at 1008.
8. Id.
9. Hartwell v. Hartwell Co., 400 A.2d 529 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979).
10. Id. at 534.
11. Id. at 531.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 534.
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court held that the landlord's lien was subordinate to the creditor's perfected
security interest.'
Other jurisdictions have resolved similar priority disputes using pre-
UCC law where such law reflected a rule of absolute preference for the
landlord. In In re Einhorn Bros., Inc. 9 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that because the UCC did not apply to landlords' liens, Pennsylvania's
enactment of the UCC did not alter existing Pennsylvania law on landlords'
liens.20 Examining Pennsylvania's pre-UCC law, the court found that a
landlord's lien enjoyed priority over various security interests." Accordingly,
the landlord's lienprevailed against the bank's competing security interest even
though the bank perfected its interest before the landlord's lien attached.'
2. "First in Time, First in Right"
In jurisdictions where pre-UCC law did not supply a rule of absolute
preference for either the landlord or the creditor, some courts have followed a
"first in time, first in right" rationale.' In National Investment Trust v. First
National Bank John Shuckertt entered a lease with National Investment
Trust.2 Nine months later, First National Bank in Albuquerque loaned Jeanne
Lyons funds allowing her to buy out John Shuckertt's furniture business.26 To
secure the loan, the bank perfected a security interest in the business's
inventory then owned or later acquired.27 Subsequently, Shuckertt assigned
Lyons the lease with National Investment Trust. 8 Ultimately, Lyons went
bankrupt, and First National Bank sought to enforce its security interest in the
inventory located on the leased premises.' National Investment Trust also
stepped forward to assert its statutory landlord's lien.3° In an unusual twist, the
court resolved this dispute by finding that both parties' interests attached at the
same time-the moment the property was brought to the leased premises.3 '
However, the court noted that underNew Mexico case law, FirstNational Bank
could not be charged with notice of National Investment's lease because First
National perfected its security interest over a month before the tenant entered
18. Id.
19. 272 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1959).
20. Id. at 440-41.
21. Id. at440.
22. Id. at443.
23. See Annotation, supra note 3, § 2, at 1008.
24. 543 P.2d 482 (N.M. 1975).
25. Id. at483.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 482.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 483.
1999] 1053
3
Johnson: Property Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEw
the lease agreement with National Investment.32 Moreover, the landlord "had
notice of the recorded security interest at the time of the assignment."'33
Therefore, the bank's security interest had priority over Investment Trust's
landlords' lien.3"
B. Using UCC Priority Rules
A minority of courts have resolved the priority issue between secured
creditors and landlords by determining the priority of the competing interests
using Article 9 principles, despite the Article's specific exclusion of landlords'
liens.35 The rationale commonly provided for this exclusion is that Article 9
governs only consensual liens.36 Landlords' liens are nonconsensual because
the landlord's right to distrain property is a statutory right, and the subsequent
lien arises and attaches by operation of law.37
Courts in several jurisdictions have held that landlords' liens are
excluded from Article 9 only in terms of the liens' creation-meaning the
manner in which the liens attach and are perfected.38 Using this reasoning, once
the lien has arisen, the Article 9 rules would govern the interaction of the non-
UCC and any other UCC created liens. A court reading the UCC broadly could
therefore use Article 9 to decide the priority of competing liens even if one of
the liens was created outside Article 9.
The Illinois Appellate Court applied Article 9 principles in Peterson
v. Zeigler39 and held that a creditor with aprior perfected security interest in the
tenant's property enjoyed priority over a landlord's statutory lien.' Although
the Peterson court recognized the exclusion of landlords' liens from Article 9,
it noted that "[i]n order for article nine to be the comprehensive statute that it
was meant to be on the subject of consensual security interests, article nine
must always supply a rule for determining the priorities between a consensual
security interest and any other kind of lien."'"
32. Id. at484.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Annotation, supra note 3, § 2, at 1008.
36. See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAWOF SECURED TRANSACrIONSUNDER THEUNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 1.08(2) (1993).
37. See Daniel A. Harvey, Article 9's Exclusion of Consensual Landlord's Liens:
King Furniture City Revisited, 16 UCC LJ. 360, 360-61 (1984).
38. See generally Annotation, supra note 3, § 5, at 1012-13 (discussing recent
decisions from Illinois and Texas in which courts applied UCC rules to priority disputes between
landlords' liens and secured interests).
39. 350 N.E.2d 356 (111. App. Ct. 1976).
40. Id. at 362.
41. Id.
1054 [Vol. 50:1051
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III. SOUTH CAROLINA'S NoN-UCC PRIORITY RULE & THE REPEAL OF
SECTION 27-36-260
The cases discussed in Part U reveal that, in many jurisdictions,
determining priority between perfected security interests and landlords' liens
is a relatively simple process despite Article 9's exclusion of landlords' liens
from its coverage. Courts faced with the issue have generally been able to
determine priority according to pre-UCC, common-law rules. However, South
Carolina's non-UCC law on this priority issue has been significantly
overhauled by the South Carolina General Assembly.
Prior to 1988, South Carolina had a statutory provision that provided
a rule for determining priority between a landlord's lien and a creditor's
security interest.42 However, the General Assembly repealed section 27-39-260
for reasons discussed below. The repeal of section 27-39-260 in 1988 took
from the judiciary a relatively simple solution for resolving this dispute.
South Carolina has recognized a landlord's right to distrain a tenant's
property since 1712.43 However, this right has caused priority problems due to
a timing difference between a landlord's right to distrain property on the leased
premises and the subsequent attachment of the landlord's lien. Traditionally,
a landlord's right to distrain a tenant's property automatically arose upon the
lease's effective date,44 and it would extend to all property located upon the
leased premises.4" However, an actual lien on the property would not attach
until a tenant defaulted on the lease terms and the landlord initiated a judicial
proceeding known as "levying for distress" on the tenant's property. 46
This gap between a landlord's right to distrain property on the
premises and the subsequent attachment of the lien severely threatened a
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-39-260 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed 1988).
43. Act effective Jan. 1, 1989, No. 494, 1988 S.C. Acts 4519.
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-39-260 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed 1988); see generally
Harvey, supra note 37, at 363-64 (discussing the history of the common-law and statutory
landlord's lien).
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-39-260 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed 1988). The statute
provided:
When property distrained for arrears of rent is subject to the lien
of a chattel mortgage placed upon such property and recorded before the
rent contract was entered upon or before such property was brought upon
the rented premises, the landlord may pay the amount due upon such
mortgage debt and subject the property to the payment thereof as well as
to the payment of the amount due for rent and the tenant shall inform the
officer making distress of any such liens. If the landlord declines or fails
to pay such mortgage debt the officer shall return such property on which
such chattel mortgage may be a lien to the tenant. And if the landlord have
actual notice of any unpaid purchase money lien, such lien shall have
priority to his claim for rent in the same manner as above provided for
certain chattel mortgages.
Id.
46. Frady v. Smith, 247 S.C. 353, 357-58, 147 S.E.2d 412,414 (1966).
1999] 1055
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creditor's interest in any property located on the premises that served as
collateral. Before the repeal of section 27-39-260, a creditor holding a secured
interest in the collateral was accorded statutory priority only if the creditor had
perfected its security interest before the lease commenced or before the
property was brought onto the leased premises.47 Thus, if the security interest
attached after the lease's commencement, when the property was already
located on the leased premises, the landlord's lien received priority over the
creditor's interest even though the creditor perfected it interest first.48 This was
true even if the landlord had actual knowledge of the security interest's
existence. 4
Section 27-39-260 contained serious problems. For example, under the
statute, a creditor might perfect a security interest in the "furniture and fixtures"
of a local business operated upon leased premises. If at any time the tenant
defaulted on the rent, the landlord could exercise his statutory right to distrain
the property on the premises. As soon as the landlord levied on the property,
his lien would arise over the tenant's chattels, including the furniture and
fixtures, located on the leased premises. Under section 27-39-260, the
landlord's lien would enjoy priority even though the creditor's lien was
perfected first and the creditor lacked knowledge of the competing lien on the
property, which arose by operation of law when the landlord levied for distress.
As a result of this potentially unfair treatment of creditors under the
statute, the South Carolina General Assembly repealed section 27-39-260 with
the following explanation:
The net effect [of section 27-39-260] is that
a large number of fully perfected
nonpurchase money security interests are
potentially subordinate to distress liens.
This is inconsistent with the priority rules in
the UCC. Section 36-9-301(1) states that a
perfected security interest takes priority
over any lien creditor unless the creditor
obtains a lien before the security interest is
perfected; and a landlord cannot qualify as
a lien creditor until after distress and levy."0
47. S.C. CODEANN. § 27-39-260 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed 1988).
48. Id.
49. Frady, 247 S.C. at 358-59, 147 S.E.2d at 414.
50. Act effective Jan. 1, 1989, No. 494, 1988 S.C. Acts 4519-20 (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). The UCC section referred to in the General Assembly's explanation provides
in pertinent part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided... an unperfected
security interest is subordinate to the rights of:
(a) persons entitled to priority under § 36-9-312;
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor without
[Vol. 50:10511056
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By repealing section 27-39-260, the General Assembly disposed of
South Carolina's non-UCC rule for determining priority disputes between
landlords' liens and prior perfected security interests. The General Assembly
failed to replace section 27-39-260 with another statute reflecting a rule of
preference for either the landlord or the creditor. Although the legislative
history shows that the General Assembly intended section 36-9-301(1) of the
UCC to supply the rule for resolving priority disputes betweenthese competing
liens, it didnot square this plan with section 36-9-104's exclusion of landlords'
liens from Article 9 coverage.5 ' The General Assembly's failure to resolve, or
even to address, this conflict after repealing section 27-29-260 left the South
Carolina judiciary with little guidance to determine this issue.
IV. Wingard
The Wingards operated the Westside Pharmacy.52 J. M. Smith held a
promissory note issued in the amount of approximately $65,000 that was
secured by a security agreement in the inventory and fixtures located on the
leased premises.5 3 Smith had perfected this interest "by the filing of financing
statements in the office of the Clerk of Court for Greenwood County on July
28, 1995, and in the office of the Secretary of State for South Carolina on
August 7, 1995."' After Smith perfected this interest, Wingard filed for
bankruptcy in December of 1995." Subsequently, Wingard's lease agreement
was extinguished pursuant to Chapter Seven of the Federal Bankruptcy Code."'
The Greenwood Petroleum Company (GPC) purchased the property
knowledge of the security interest and before it is
perfected;
(3) A "lien creditor'means a creditor who has
acquired a lien on the property involved by
attachment, levy or the like and includes an assignee
for benefit of creditors from the time of assigmnent,
and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing
of the petition or a receiver in equity from the time of
appointment. Unless all the creditors represented had
knowledge of the security interest such a
representative of creditors is a lien creditor without
knowledge even though he personally has knowledge
of the security interest.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-301 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
51. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-104(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
52. Appellant's Brief at 3, Greenwood Petroleum Co. v. Wingard (Exparte Smith),
330 S.C. 479,498 S.E.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1998) (No. 96-CP-24-604).
53. Wingard, 330 S.C. at 481,498 S.E.2d at 909.
54. Appellant's Brief at 3.
55. Id.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(4) (1994).
1999] 1057
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where Wingard had operated his business in March of 1996."7 GPC informed
Wingard that if he failed to remove the inventory from the premises, GPC
would charge Wingard a rental fee in the amount of $2,000 per month."8
Wingard failed to remove his property and never paid rent to GPC.s9 After six
months, GPC seized Wingard's inventory to collect $12,000 in back rent
pursuant to sections 27-39-210 through 27-39-360 of the Code of Laws of
South Carolina?° These sections provide a landlord with a statutory remedy for
distraint of property.61
At the commencement of the distraint procedure, Smith contested
GPC's right to distrain the property based on his prior perfected security
interest in the inventory.62 Smith argued to the Greenwood County Magistrate
that his prior security interest had priority over the landlord's right to distrain
the property.6s The magistrate disagreed, noting that "'the presence of personal
property at the leased premises (not the ownership)... makes it subject to
distraint."' The circuit court affirmed the magistrate's decision and noted that
"'section 36-9-104 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that the chapter
[Article 9] does not apply to a landlord's lien.'
6
On appeal the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that GPC, as
landlord, was entitled to recover "free of Smith's security interest.' 66 The
Wingard court modeled its response to this issue after the recent case of
Tolemac, Inc. v. United Trading, Inc.67 In Tolemac a landlord exercised his
statutory distraint over a tenant's property as well as property belonging to a
third party that was located on the leased premises.68 The third-party owner
challenged the distraint action, claiming the distraint violated his substantive
due process rights.69 The Tolemac court noted that the plain language of section
27-39-250 provides that "'all property upon the rented premises is subject to
distress"' 7 and held that the landlord could distrain the third party's property
so long as the landlord first applied the tenant's personal property to the debt.7'
57. Appellant's Brief at 4.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Greenwood Petroleum Co. v. Wingard (Exparte Smith), 330 S.C. 479,481,498
S.E.2d 908, 909 (Ct. App. 1998).
61. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-39-210 to -360 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
62. Wingard, 330 S.C. at 481,498 S.E.2d at 909.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 482-83,498 S.E.2d at 910.
67. 326 S.C. 103, 484 S.E.2d 593 (1997).
68. Id. at 104-05, 484 S.E.2d at 594.
69. Id. at 105,484 S.E.2d at 594. See generally Paul E. Hammack, Note, Third-Party
Lessors and Bailors Beware: South Carolina Distraint Statute Threatens Due Process, 49 S.C.
L.REv. 1259 (1998) (discussing the Tolemac decision as a violation of substantive due process).
70. Tolemac, 326 S.C. at 106, 484 S.E.2d at 595 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-39-
250 (Law. Co-op. 1991)).
71. Id.
[Vol. 50:10511058
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The Wingard court erred in using Tolemac to resolve the priority issue
between a security interest and a landlord's statutory lien by failing to
distinguish the rights of third-party property owners (to whom Tolemac should
apply) from the rights of creditors holding perfected security interests in the
property distrained.72 This distinction should be critical to the analysis because
the interests of these parties deserve different degrees of protection. While the
court recognized that Smith's claim as a secured creditor would have prevailed
under the old South Carolina statute, the court declared that priority between
the two interests could be decided by applying current South Carolina distraint
statutes.73 The court then examined section 27-39-250 and found that the
"legislature intended for a landlord to be able to distrain the property of a third
party, even though a third party holds unencumbered, complete ownership of
the property."74 The court also concluded that "a secured creditor sits in the
same posture as a third party under § 27-39-250. Therefore, the property
distrainedby the landlord is taken free of Smith's security interest."" s The court
was unpersuaded that section 27-39-250 distinguishes between a third party's
ownership and a creditor's security interest in the tenant's property.
This reasoning makes some sense. In Tolemac the court interpreted
section 27-39-250 to conclude that a third party having complete ownership of
the property on the leased premises could lose that property to a landlord's
lien.76 Therefore, if a landlord can distrain property wholly owned by a third
party under the statute, why should a creditor holding less than complete
ownership of the property be accorded greater protection? So long as a
creditor's lien or security interest in the property is less than full ownership of
that property, then the creditor's property should be subject to the landlord's
distraint under section 27-39-250.
However, arguments exist to refute the proposition that a lien is the
legal equivalent of ownership.77 When parties release property from their
possession, not having secured it, the property becomes subject to the laws of
the place where it comes to rest.78 Admiralty law provides a helpful analogy.
If one ships property over navigable waters, the relinquished property becomes
subject to the laws of admiralty.79 Should the property become derelict, it may
be salvaged, with the salvagor accorded the right to recover in rem against the
72. Greenwood Petroleum Co. v. Wingard (Exparte Smith), 330 S.C. 479,482-83,
498 S.E.2d 908, 910 (Ct. App. 1998).
73. Id. at 482, 498 S.E.2d at 910.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 482-83, 498 S.E.2d at 910.
76. Tolemac, 326 S.C. at 106, 484 S.E.2d 595.
77. See, e.g., Appellant's Reply Brief at 2, Wingard, 330 S.C. 479, 498 S.E.2d 908
(No. 96-CP-24-604).
78. See Wendell Carnahan, Tangible Property and the Conflict ofLaws, 2 U. CHI. L.
REV. 345, 348 (1935).
79. See generally THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW §§ 1-1
to 1-12 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing admiralty jurisdiction).
1999] 1059
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property."0 The owner in that instance is unable to protect the property from the
operation of a maritime lien that arises against the property.8' In the same
fashion, a third party, having forgone any attempt to secure the property, will
be unable to protect it from the operation of a landlord's lien pursuant to
section 27-29-250 once the property arrives upon a leased premises.
Alternatively, one who has taken the necessary steps to perfect a
secured interest in property has done more than a third-party owner who has
simply relinquished the property and nothing else. Consequently, the law
should afford greater protection to those who attempt to protect their rights to
the fullest extent available by law. The court could have further distinguished
a third-party owner and the holder of a secured interest in property on the
premises by examining the subject of notice. As a practical matter, because the
law treats property belonging to a third party differently than the tenant's
property under a landlord's lien, 2 when the landlord attempts to exercise his
distraint, the tenant is likely to become rapidly bereft of all possessions. The
tenant may deny ownership of anything of value located on the premises, and
the landlord's remedy will be less effective. On the other hand, because a
security interest is publicly recorded, the landlord at least can verify exactly
what property on the premises is available to distrain and what property is tied
up in creditors' security interests.
Viewed in this light, granting the secured creditor greater legal
protection than third-party owners seems fundamentally sound. As discussed
above, the interests involved are distinct; a creditor does not, as the court held
in Wingard, axiomatically "sit[] in the same posture as a third party under § 27-
39-250.,,13 Therefore, the court should not have relied on Tolemac to decide the
priority issue presented in Wingard. Instead, the court should have looked to
an earlier South Carolina case, Oxford Finance Companies v. Burgess.84 In
Oxford the South Carolina Supreme Court examined the issue of priority
between a landlord's lien and a creditor's secured interest and ruled in the
creditor's favor.85 The court impliedly recognized that the repeal of section 27-
26-260 left a landlord with no statutory right to recover against a prior
perfected security interest in a tenant's property.
s6
In Oxford the tenants leased from Burgess a lot for a mobile home.
8 7
The lease agreement commenced on November 13, 1986, and two days later
80. See generally 3A MARTIN J. NORRiS, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 155, at 11-10
(1997) (describing in rem proceedings against salvaged property and discussing the owners'
rights).
81. Id.
82. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-39-250 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
83. Greenwood Petroleum Co. v. Wingard (Exparte Smith), 330 S.C. 479,482,498
S.E.2d 908, 910 (Ct. App. 1998).
84. 303 S.C. 534,402 S.E.2d 480 (1991).
85. Id. at 535-3 6, 402 S.E.2d at 480.
86. Id. at 537-38, 402 S.E.2d at 481-82.
87. Id. at 536, 402 S.E.2d at 480.
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the tenants purchased a mobile home giving the seller a security interest in the
home.8 Oxford Finance Companies ultimately acquired the note and filed a
certificate of title on March 27, 1987.89 Two years later, the tenants abandoned
the property, defaulted on the purchase money note secured by the mobile
home, and became delinquent on the landlord's rent." The landlord refused to
surrender possession of the mobile home to Oxford Finance Company,
claiming that "he was entitled to the mobile home by virtue of a landlord's lien
for past due rent and late charges with priority over Oxford's security
interest."9'
This case presented the classic timing problem discussed above. 2 In
Oxford the secured party perfected a security interest in the mobile home after
the effective date of the lease. Therefore, under the old statutory scheme, the
mobile home would have been subject to the landlord's statutory distraint93
even though the security interest was perfected and recorded before the
landlord ever actually levied against the property to become a lien creditor.
94
However, the courtrecognizedthe General Assembly's repeal ofsection27-39-
260 and awarded the mobile home to Oxford, thus recognizing Oxford Finance
Company's priority as the holder of the prior perfected security interest.95
Unfortunately, the Oxford opinion does not set forth fully the rights of
the competing lien parties. The court decided the case by focusing on the
legislature's repeal of section 27-39-260, under which the landlord claimed
relief.96 Therefore, the court held that while that "statute may have given the
Landlord some rights to the mobile home,"'97 the statute's repeal applied
retroactively, and the landlord enjoyed neither privilege nor right to deny
possession of the mobile home to Oxford.9 Although the court failed to state
explicitly the law courts must use to untangle priority disputes, the opinion
implies that the repeal of section 27-39-260 eliminated a landlord's right to
recover against any security interest that is perfected before the landlord
becomes a lien creditor.
V. CONCLUSION
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has ostensibly established a clear
rule of preference in cases involving priority disputes between landlords and
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 536, 402 S.E.2d at 481.
91. Id.
92. See supra Part IT.
93. S.C. CODEANN. § 27-39-260 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed 1988).
94. Id.
95. Burgess, 303 S.C. at 538, 402 S.E.2d at 482.
96. See supra Part IlI.
97. Burgess, 303 S.C. at 537-38, 402 S.E.2d at 481.
98. Id. at 537-38, 402 S.E.2d 481-82.
1999] 1061
11
Johnson: Property Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW RmVIEW [
secured creditors-the creditor loses. After Wingard, the Tolemac holding is
so broad that it would allow a landlord to levy distress against a cab left
running at the curb of his rental property, no matter who has a perfected
security interest in the vehicle, because the court interpreted the statute's
language that "all property upon the rented premises is subject to distress" too
literally.99 This result ignores the Uniform Commercial Code and South
Carolina's legislative history.' ° Ironically, the type of result reached by the
Wingard court was the impetus that prompted the legislature to repeal section
27-36-260. Under the Wingard rule, just as under the old statute, "a large
number of fully perfected nonpurchase money security interests are potentially
subordinate to distress liens."'1'
The legislature intended that a landlord's lien would be subject to the
rules of priority set forth in section 36-9-304 even though the landlord's lien
arose outside of Article 9."°2 According to this scheme, once landlords become
"lien creditors" under section 36-9-304 by levying for distress, they would
enjoy priority only over unperfected security interests in tenants' property. 3
This scheme would follow the legislative history concerning the repeal of
section 27-39-260 and would also allow fair treatment of creditors. Under the
Wingard rule, a creditor is unable to acquire knowledge of a competing lien
because the landlord's lien arises by operation of law after the creditor has
already extended credit. Conversely, the scheme advocated when the legislature
repealed section 27-39-260 at least affords landlords an opportunity to acquire
notice of any perfected security interests impacting property located upon their
premises because those interests will be filed and recorded.
The Wingard decision ignores the distinction between a creditor's
security interest and a third party's property located on leased premises. As
discussed in this Note, creditors merit greater protection under these
circumstances than third parties who have put forth no effort to secure their
property. For these reasons, the South Carolina Supreme Court should grant
certiorari on this case and apply Article 9 rules to resolve this problem to
prevent landlords from prevailing against any and all prior perfected interests
in property that merely happen to occupy their premises.
James Johnson
99. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-39-250 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
100. Act effective Jan. 1, 1989, No. 494, 1988 S.C. Acts 4520.
101. Id. at 4519.
102. Id. at 4520.
103. See supra Part 111.
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